3 be done to a potential victim is substantial. Even if there is no particular reason to think the evidence will be moved, sold, consumed, hidden, or otherwise made unavailable in the time necessary to procure a warrant, the mere existence of those possibilities pushes against the impetus to seek a warrant.
From the perspective of law enforcement, the ideal solution in such cases would be a procedure that permits issuance of a search warrant before probable cause exists to believe the contraband or evidentiary items are present. Such a warrant then could be executed almost immediately once reason exists to believe the items sought have arrived at the scene of the authorized search. That is exactly what happened in U.S. v. Grubbs.
8

I. Issuance of a Conditional Search Warrant Does Not Violate the Fourth Amendment
The Postal Inspection Service was in the business of offering child pornography to Internet shoppers. 9 Jeffrey Grubbs ordered a videotape from the undercover postal inspector operating the website and, conveniently, agents of the Postal Inspection Service (the "Service")
were able to set up a "controlled delivery" of the goods to Mr. Grubbs' home. 10 Since the
Service knew exactly what was going to be delivered, and where and when it was going to be delivered, an application for a search warrant was prepared and presented to a magistrate for approval.
11
The affidavit supporting the warrant application included a recitation of the probable cause facts, and included a statement that:
8 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006) . 9 See id. at 92. 10 See id. 11 See id.
Execution of this search warrant will not occur unless and until the parcel has been received by a person(s) and has been physically taken into the residence….
At that time, and not before, this search warrant will be executed by me and other United States Postal inspectors, with appropriate assistance from other law enforcement officers in accordance with this warrant's command.
12
The warrant issued and was executed two days later, after the package containing the videotape provided by the Service was delivered to the Grubbs' residence.
13
As expected, the evidence that had been delivered quite helpfully by the Service was found during execution of the search warrant, and Grubbs was arrested. 14 Subsequently, the accused moved to suppress the incriminating videotape, claiming that its seizure was pursuant to an invalid warrant. 15 Failing to describe the "triggering condition" 16 in the warrant (receiving the contraband and taking it into the home) was, according to Grubbs, a fatal defect because the affidavit that did include the triggering condition was not attached to the warrant or given to
Grubbs at the time of the search. 17 The District Court rejected this argument but the Ninth Circuit adopted it, requiring the condition precedent to be set out either on the face of the warrant or in an affidavit "presented to the person whose property is being searched."
18 12 See id. 13 See id. at 93. Grubbs' wife signed for the package and took it into the home. See id. 14 See id. 15 See id. Presumably, there was no claim by the Government of consent to search the home or the existence of any other exception to the warrant requirement. Grubbs had been detained as he left his house shortly after the package was delivered and before the warrant was executed. See id. 16 Satisfying a "triggering condition" -a condition precedent -effectively marks the establishment of the final probable cause requisite justifying the search. In other words, the "warrant" is no more than a piece of paper without legal force until the triggering condition is met. At that point, the paper is transformed in a valid court order to search. 17 See id. 18 See id. at 93-94.
Writing for the majority in the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia first tackled the question of whether a so-called "anticipatory" search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. 19 If probable cause exists to believe contraband is present on premises at the time a warrant issues, it is "anticipatory" only in the sense that the issuing magistrate believes it likely the evidence still will be present when the warrant is executed, but the warrant is not considered anticipatory in a way that prevents its issuance or execution. Justice Scalia explained that:
Because the probable-cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all warrants are, in a sense, "anticipatory." In the typical case where the police seek permission to search a house for an item they believe is already located there, the magistrate's determination that there is probable cause for the search amounts to a prediction that the item will still be there when the warrant is executed. 20 Consequently, it makes no difference to validity that the item expected to be found on the premises is known not to be there at the time of the issuance of the warrant, as long as probable cause exists to believe it will be on the premises at the time the warrant is executed.
21
Anticipatory warrants may be "no different in principle from ordinary warrants," 22 but they are different in one important practical way. Warrants usually do not contain a condition precedent. For ones that do, it is necessary to establish not only that probable cause exists at the time of issuance to believe that the item to be seized eventually will be found on the premises, but also that probable cause exists to believe the triggering condition actually will occur. 23 Viewed in light of practice, however, this "additional" requirement adds little or nothing to the distinction between ordinary warrants and anticipatory ones. Grubbs provides an example typical of the cases in which an anticipatory warrant might be used. The Postal Inspection
Service could say with complete confidence that child pornography would be found in the Grubbs' home in the future because the Service was going to deliver it there. 24 Indeed, the magistrate issuing the warrant in this case could inspect the child pornography to determine its illegal nature even before it was delivered.
Not all anticipatory warrants involve contraband controlled by law enforcement, of course. The police may receive reliable information that an illegal item will be delivered by a third party in the near future to a suspect. Unlike Grubbs, the delivery is not one controlled by law enforcement. Even so, probable cause to believe the contraband will be delivered to the site 23 See id. at 96-97. Justice Scalia spelled out this requirement in his opinion for the Grubbs majority: …[F]or a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place," but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur. The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause determination. Id. 24 The reported cases in which anticipatory warrants have been used most often involve child pornography or, if some other form of contraband, like drugs, one that is controlled by a law enforcement agent. The reported cases in which anticipatory warrants have been used most often involve child pornography or, if some other form of contraband, like drugs, one that is controlled by a law enforcement agent. See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding a search warrant issued for a person suspected of interstate transportation of cocaine before he actually arrived in the state); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1990) (approving the use of anticipatory search warrant in a case involving a controlled delivery of cocaine); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.) (ruling in favor of a search warrant based on a controlled delivery of child pornography, stating that prior issuance of a search warrant is permissible based on the fact that the evidence was on a sure course to its destination); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with the test initially proposed by the United States v. Hale that an anticipatory warrant, in this case involving a controlled delivery of child pornography through the United States mail, is permissible "where the contraband to be seized is on a sure course to its destination").
necessarily involves evidence -and probably enough evidence to establish probable cause -that the delivery actually will occur. However limited the value of the requirement of probable cause that the condition precedent will be met in the future, it might be seen at least as reinforcing the Court's message to law enforcement that an anticipatory warrant is not an invitation to search prematurely.
Premature search was at the heart of Grubbs' argument that the triggering condition be spelled out in the warrant, or in the affidavit that is then attached to the warrant, in order to give the executing officer notice that the warrant's validity depends upon the condition having been met at the time of execution. This argument was met by the Court's majority noting only that, "the Fourth Amendment does not require that the triggering condition for an anticipatory search warrant be set forth in the warrant itself." 25 Undeniably, the Fourth Amendment contains no textual reference to a "triggering condition," much less an explicit command that such a condition be communicated in a warrant to the executing officer. 26 The Court nevertheless could have read into the Amendment's reasonableness requirement the need to specify a "starting point" for the execution of the warrant. Justice Souter, author of the concurring opinion in Grubbs, pointed out that, 35 This "argument at the threshold" that the Grubbs majority seems to be imagining does not really represent the purpose of including the triggering condition in the warrant. The Court is correct, of course, in thinking that such an encounter would be unproductive, and therefore should not be encouraged by giving the homeowner grounds for arguing with the executing officer. Instead, the purpose of such a requirement is to alert the executing officer that the warrant may not be valid. In other words, including the triggering condition on the face of the warrant could prevent the violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Naming the triggering condition seems a small burden to bear in order to protect against an inadvertent unlawful intrusion.
would at least be put on notice that he or she is about to act on uncertain authorization. Justice
Souter's concurring opinion concludes by observing that in such a case, If the police were then to enter anyway without a reasonable (albeit incorrect) justification, the search would certainly be open to serious challenge as unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
36
In short, under Grubbs the officer who is given an anticipatory warrant to execute may not know that the warrant is anticipatory, or what the triggering condition is, or whether the triggering condition has been met. And the homeowner whose residence is about to be searched need not be given a chance even to inform the officer of any shortcoming prior to execution.
II. The Short and Uncertain Life of Anticipatory Search Warrants in Texas
The glory and the danger of federalism is that a state's values may be expressed through its own laws. Those values are not defined entirely by a national compact. If the state believes its citizens are ill-protected by the rights guaranteed in the United States Constitution, it may afford its citizens additional protections. Accordingly, Texas procedural law in numerous ways limits the authority of law enforcement, ways that exceed the reach of the Bill of Rights to the federal constitution. 37 Texas also is free to provide its citizens less protection, effectively forcing
Texans to rely on federal constitutional safeguards. he was actually charged with possession of cocaine discovered during a search of his residence, a search conducted pursuant to an anticipatory warrant.
42
A federal postal inspector corresponded with the defendant and intended to deliver contraband to him while disguised as a mail carrier. 43 Before carrying out this delivery, the inspector obtained a warrant based on his belief that child pornography and other evidence would be found on the premises. 44 It was during the execution of this warrant following delivery of the . 41 See id. at 745. 42 See id. 43 See id. 44 See id.
package that the agent found cocaine in a jewelry box. 45 Mr. Toone, the defendant, was charged in state court with possessing cocaine, and in federal court for the obscenity charge.
46
The defense moved to suppress the cocaine, in part on the ground that it violated the language of article 18.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that:
No search warrant shall issue for any purpose in this state unless sufficient facts are first presented to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable cause does in fact exist for its issuance. A sworn affidavit setting forth substantial facts establishing probable cause shall be filed in every instance in which a search warrant is requested.
47
Subsection (c) of article 18.01, also cited by the defendant, requires probable cause to believe "that the property or items constituting evidence to be searched for or seized are located at or on the particular person, place, or thing to be searched."
48
Toone contended that no offense had been committed at the time the warrant issued because no contraband had yet been delivered by the government agent to the residence. 49 In effect, probable cause could not establish that the "items constituting evidence" were "located at or on the … place … to be searched" because the inspector and magistrate were aware when the 45 See id. It is unclear from the opinion why the searching officer opened the jewelry box. Unless the box was unusually large, or the contraband materials were delivered in a very compact form, it seems a challenge might have been made to the scope of the search. 46 warrant affidavit was presented for review that the obscene material had not been delivered to Mr. Toone.
50
After noting the opinions of other state and federal courts that anticipatory search warrants are constitutional, the court of appeals turned to Toone's argument. It concluded that the warrant was "valid." 51 This general finding seems to have been in response to the defendant's contention that article 18.01(b) prohibited the issuance of such warrants. The court did not address, however, whether the language of article 18.01(c) prohibits the issuance of an anticipatory warrant. 52 The court avoided that decision by employing the "reverse silver-platter
The silver-platter doctrine harkens back to the time when evidence seized pursuant to a state warrant would be handed to federal authorities on a "silver platter" for use in a federal prosecution. 54 This procedure avoided the application of stricter federal procedural law since the evidence, validly obtained under state law, was not obtained unlawfully under a federal rule.
55
Federalism proved its utility as more than a structural concept of constitutional law, but in a manner that the Founders could not have foreseen.
In subsequent years, due to procedural and substantive developments in states and to the 69 An x-ray of the package, which contained a bread maker, revealed objects inside the appliance that appeared not to belong there. 70 At the instruction of the Houston agent, the package was sent to him, opened and inspected. 71 Inside, the agent discovered two bags of cocaine.
72
A federal anticipatory search warrant was obtained by the Houston federal agent for the apartment to which the package was addressed. 73 With the aid of the local police department, the package was delivered to the addressee, who identified himself and signed a receipt for its delivery. 74 A device had been placed inside the package to signal waiting federal officers when it was opened, but after two hours without a signal, they entered the residence. 75 Inside, they found the unopened box, along with numerous other items associated with the shipping of drugs, were, in the view of the appellant, "personal writings," they were beyond the scope of the warrant's authority. 85 Again, the court of appeals overruled the point of error on the ground that state law simply did not apply to this valid federal warrant.
86
Apart from a sufficiency of the evidence argument, Mahmoudi's only other objection to the admissibility of the evidence was that no probable cause existed to believe evidentiary items other than the cocaine in the package would be found in his residence. 87 From the totality of circumstances, the appellate court concluded that it was reasonable for the magistrate to infer the probability of the existence of such items on the premises. 88 Mahmoudi was shown to be a "drug smuggler" and the federal agent who applied for the warrant swore that such evidentiary items would likely be found in the home of a smuggler.
89
III. Anticipating the Future of the Texas Anticipatory Warrant
Magistrates in Texas are issuing anticipatory search warrants in purely state cases. 90 To date, no published opinion validates this practice, and the criminal procedure code is silent on the subject. 91 No court has held that the Texas Constitution permits issuance of an anticipatory warrant. In other words, the use of these warrants may or may not be prohibited, or restricted in 85 See id. 86 See id. 87 See id. at 72. 88 See id. at 73. 89 See id. 90 In 2010 and 2011, I taught classes on this subject to municipal court judges from all over Texas in a training program offered by the Texas Municipal Courts Education Center. When asked whether any of those attending the classes had issued anticipatory warrants, several judges in each class responded that they had issued such warrants and, in some cases, had been doing so for several years. 91 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure addresses search warrants generally, but contains no provision specifically addressing anticipatory warrants. Other, general statutory language may apply to the practice, as discussed infra. should be read as providing more protection, the Court concluded that he had "preserved nothing" and treated his "claim" as a non-event.
102
B. Article 18.01(b)
Toone did preserve his argument that articles 18.01(b) and (c) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure were violated, and the trial judge agreed, granting his suppression motion.
103
The court of appeals' analysis of this contention consisted of an observation that no case law in An affidavit establishing sufficient probable cause facts to believe that upon the satisfaction of a triggering condition, contraband or evidence will be present, arguably supports the issuance of a warrant; that is, "probable cause does in fact exist for … issuance" of a search warrant. Grubbs also requires probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will occur, 110 but nothing in article 18.01(b) mirrors this element. The anticipatory warrant either is valid because the triggering condition has been met -the contraband or evidence has been delivered -or it is not valid because the condition remains unsatisfied. In effect, an anticipatory warrant has no legal force at all until the condition precedent is met, at which time the warrant springs to life by operation of law. Under either the formulation of Grubbs or the wording of article 18.01(b), the result is the same.
In a way, the probability is even stronger when a magistrate issues an anticipatory warrant than when an ordinary warrant issues. In the latter case, the magistrate makes a calculation that evidence probably will be found on the premises when execution occurs, but with many anticipatory warrants it is virtually certain that the evidence will be present upon execution because the government often will have delivered it to the premises, knowing precisely what it was. When an ordinary warrant issues, the magistrate not only must determine the level of probability that evidence will be found in the place to be searched, but must decide how likely it is that the item being searched for is contraband or evidence. This often is the case with an anticipatory warrant. The magistrate in Grubbs could inspect the obscene material that was to be delivered to the suspect to evaluate whether it satisfied the legal definition of obscenity, a rare opportunity indeed for magistrates or law enforcement officers. Similarly, if drugs are to be delivered, they can be tested and weighed ahead of time, establishing their characteristics with much greater certainty than usually is the case. Of course, not all anticipatory warrants involve delivery by the government, but those that do present special opportunities and advantages.
Those that do not are no less reliable as a group than ordinary warrants.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's approach to the probable cause question, it may be that a (1) that a specific offense has been committed, (2) that the specifically described property or items that are to searched for or seized constitute evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person committed the offense, and (3) that the property or items constituting evidence to be searched for or seized are located at or on the particular person, place, or thing to be searched. ….
By its terms, article 18.01(c) applies only to search warrants issued "under Article 18.02(10)."
118 That subdivision authorizes a search warrant to issue for "property or items, except the personal writings by the accused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting evidence tending to show that a particular person committed an offense." 119 Taken out of context, this provision seems quite broad. It has been construed, however, to extend only to items of "mere evidence," 120 and not to just any and all kinds of evidence.
121
Since any item sought pursuant to a search warrant must be believed to have evidentiary value, it is useful to consider what is not included within the phrase "mere evidence." The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the term as describing "evidence connected with a crime, but does not consist of fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband." 122 This interpretation was evident at the time it was adopted by the Court from a careful review of the entire "laundry list"
of objects in article 18.02 for which a search warrant may issue. 123 Since the Court characterized "mere evidence" in this way, the list has expanded to include "persons," 124 but otherwise remains the same.
An item of mere evidence might include a blood, breath, or hair sample, a business record, articles of clothing, or virtually anything that may point to the guilt or innocence of a suspect. "Fruits" of a crime, on the other hand, are those objects obtained as a result of the criminal activity, like the jewelry taken in a burglary. Similarly, an "instrumentality" of crime is a thing used to commit the offense, perhaps a crowbar or pistol. "Contraband," of course, is anything that is illegal to possess. 125 Virtually anything of evidentiary value other than fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband qualifies as "mere evidence" and falls within article 18.02(10).
Probably because the scope of an evidentiary search warrant is so broad, not all magistrates are authorized to issue these warrants. The limitation also may be based in part on recognition that items of mere evidence, which are innocent in themselves, may be found on premises controlled by persons not engaged in any criminal activity, and they may not be instantly recognizable as related to criminal activity. Searches for such items may, therefore, be particularly intrusive.
Article 18.01(c) requires the issuing magistrate for an evidentiary warrant to be a judge of a municipal court of record or county court who is licensed to practice law, or a judge of a higher level court. 126 Exceptions are made for counties that do not have attorney-judges in the lower courts, and in certain blood-warrant cases for counties lacking lower level courts of record.
127
The definition of evidentiary warrants restricts their reach in a way that may not apply to many anticipatory warrant situations. Where the evidence sought to be recovered is child pornography (e.g., Grubbs) or drugs (e.g., Mahmoudi), the anticipatory warrant is not an evidentiary warrant because those items are contraband and authorized by other parts of Article 125 See BLACK'S LEGAL DICTIONARY (9 th ed. 2009) defining contraband as "goods that are unlawful to import, export, produce, or possess." 126 See TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 18.01(c). 127 See id. at Art. 18.01(i), (j).
18.02.
128 On the other hand, an anticipatory warrant may be sought for items of mere evidence, in which case the strictures of article 18.01(c) apply.
A different "Toone"
Toone's argument in the court of appeals was the right argument in the wrong case.
Child pornography was sought in the search of Toone's home, and drugs were found. 129 His state law issue, had it been considered, turned on the validity of anticipatory warrants under article 18.01(b), the provision that applies to all sorts of search warrants, and not to article 18.01(c), which is limited to evidentiary warrants. For reasons previously discussed, there is no reason after Grubbs to think a Texas court categorically would reject anticipatory warrants on the basis of language in article 18.01(b). The rules pertaining to evidentiary warrants, on the other hand, were simply inapplicable to seizure of the items sought in Toone's case. Without resort to
Grubbs and silver platters, the result would not have been different in Toone if the warrant had been issued by a Texas judge rather than a federal magistrate.
It should have been different, however, if the anticipatory warrant had been an evidentiary one. Consider the first of the requirements of article 18.01(c): The affidavit for the evidentiary warrant must set forth probable cause "that a specific offense has been committed." 130 In the event that the missing piece of evidence sought to be discovered by execution of the anticipatory warrant is essential to establish a completed crime, an affidavit alleging that the evidence will be supplied in the future does not suffice to satisfy the 128 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Arts. 18.02(6), (8) (authorizes commercial obscenity and other items for which possession is prohibited), 18.02(7) (drugs). 129 The drugs arguably were discovered in "plain-view" because the officers executing the anticipatory warrant were entitled to search for obscene material in the box where the drugs were found and it was immediately apparent to them that what they discovered was contraband. 130 
D. Execution timing problems
Professors George Dix and John Schmolesky raise a different concern in Texas law about anticipatory warrants. 135 Ordinarily, when a magistrate issues a search warrant the judge has decided, not only that probable cause exists at the time the warrant is signed, but will continue to exist for as long as it remains valid. 136 Unless a shorter period of validity is imposed by the issuing magistrate, a search warrant ordinarily remains in force for three days, exclusive of the day of its issuance and the day of its execution. 137 A longer period is allowed for execution of a warrant authorizing seizure of a sample for DNA testing. 138 The seizure of data or information from a computer drive, cell phone, or other data storage device also is subject to a special timing rule. 139 As Dix and Schmolesky correctly note, in the case of an anticipatory warrant the magistrate cannot always determine whether probable cause will continue to exist for the duration of the statutory period allowed for execution. 140 They conclude that this inability to predict the continuing vitality or duration of probable cause for some indefinite period in the future, effectively "relieves the issuing magistrate of any responsibility to consider whether the submitted facts might be sufficient to establish that probable cause exists and will continue to exist for a short period but will not continue during the statutory period for executing a warrant."
141
This concern also applies to ordinary search warrants, and explains in part why execution is time-limited. 142 Not only is evidence, to varying degrees, likely to be consumed, distributed, moved, altered, or otherwise made unavailable over time, but it also may lose its evidentiary significance as time passes. Limiting the execution period to a few days following the probable cause determination lessens the chance that probable cause will dissipate before the search is made.
If a magistrate anticipates that probable cause facts may change quickly, he or she is authorized to shorten the time allowed for execution. 143 While that alternative may alleviate the concern in case an ordinary warrant is sought, due to the nature of the anticipatory warrant the magistrate may be less able to predict whether or how the strength of the probable cause showing will change after the triggering condition occurs or, if so, how quickly it will do so. 144 At least, the magistrate who issues an anticipatory warrant should inquire into whether the probable cause facts will remain undiluted during the statutory period allowed for execution, 145 although no such requirement currently exists in Texas law. 146 It is unlikely, after all, that the officer seeking the warrant will propose such a limitation, and she has no statutory duty to do so.
E. Describing the "triggering condition"
As discussed previously, the Fourth Amendment does not require that the triggering condition for an anticipatory warrant be described on the face of that warrant, or that the affidavit describing the triggering condition be attached to the warrant. 147 Even the existence of a triggering condition is not required, nor is it necessary to identify the warrant as an "anticipatory warrant." None of this will matter, of course, if the executing officer is the affiant or someone sufficiently involved in the investigation to know that there is a triggering condition, and perhaps to know what it is.
In practice, however, officers sometimes are required to execute search warrants without having the benefit of complete information about the investigation that produced it. An anticipatory warrant is sufficiently rare that an executing officer cannot be presumed to have considered the possibility that a triggering condition has not occurred, or even that one existed.
For the reasons previously elaborated, the prospect of an unlawful search pursuant to a "warrant" that has not yet come into force may not be remediable. It is a prospect, though, that usually can be avoided by the simple expedient of doing a bit more than the Fourth Amendment requires.
If the triggering condition is set forth in the warrant, or at least in the attached affidavit, the executing officer would have at hand information that might avert an unlawful search. Even a clear legend appearing on the warrant, alerting the officer that it is not the "ordinary" kind, would improve the chances that a premature search would not occur. While neither of these requirements exists within the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, either might be addressed by a state procedure code. In the absence of a statutory directive, the magistrate always is authorized to ensure that the condition precedent is stated clearly on the warrant's face. 148 That small inconvenience, if it is one, seems a small price to pay for greater security against claims of a Fourth Amendment violation. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals observed regarding anticipatory warrants generally, "magistrates who are asked to issue such warrants must be particularly vigilant in ensuring that the opportunities for exercising unfettered discretion are eliminated."
149
IV. Anticipating and Avoiding Challenges to the Texas Anticipatory Warrant
The inclusion of mere evidence as the object of a search conducted pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant can be accomplished by modifying the language of Article 18.01(c)
or by creating an express exception for such warrants. If Texas is going to use anticipatory warrants routinely, however, a comprehensive statute should be added to chapter 18 of criminal procedure code, creating and defining the requirements and scope of such warrants in the same way that chapter addresses ordinary search warrants.
Such a statute would spell out the constitutionally mandated elements identified in Grubbs, but also would provide guidance on the staleness issue that concerns Dix and Schmolesky, and possibly require inclusion of the triggering condition on the face of the warrant, or at least mandate identifying the warrant as anticipatory. For reasons previously discussed, providing the executing officer more information about the nature and scope of the warrant could prevent searches that only retrospectively will be determined to lack probable cause. Nothing about this additional requirement thwarts the purpose of the anticipatory warrant or unduly burdens law enforcement or magistrates. To the contrary, additional clarity in court orders permitting the invasion of citizens' most private places benefits officers and better protects liberty interests.
Without sufficient guidance from the Texas courts and legislature, officers are faced with two alternatives: rely only on the very general contours found in Grubbs and Article 18.01, or avoid the use of the anticipatory warrant altogether. The former is a relatively safe course of action, assuming Texas constitutional safeguards are held to be the same as those of the Fourth Amendment, and assuming further that the search is not one for items of mere evidence, and that Article 18.01(b) is held not to create an impediment to the use of the anticipatory warrant. The "relative safety" of this course of action clearly also carries downside risk that vital evidence will be lost or harm to important societal interests may occur due to uncertainty about the validity of the search technique, an uncertainty that could be eliminated statutorily.
The alternative -avoiding the use of anticipatory warrants altogether -carries similar costs, but also can carry the benefit of returning the investigator to surer ground. If, for example, no anticipatory warrant is sought, an investigator nevertheless could prepare a warrant affidavit setting out what the officer feels sure will happen (e.g., the package will be delivered). After determining, usually through surveillance or delivery, that the suspect actually has received the contraband, the officer is free to immediately seek an ordinary search warrant 150 based on what already has happened, rather than what is expected to occur. The obvious disadvantage of this "old-school" approach is that in the interval following delivery, and before the warrant can be obtained, evidence may be moved, destroyed, modified, or consumed. If this happens, it is a high price to have paid for the uncertainty that easily could have been avoided by statutory guidance.
In spite of any rules defining and limiting anticipatory warrant use in Texas, issues will arise.
The particularity requirement, for instance, was addressed superficially in Grubbs by noting that the Fourth Amendment requires particular description only of "the place to be searched" and "the persons or things to be seized." 151 The Court used this observation only to segue into a discussion of Grubbs's argument that the triggering condition or other "precondition to the valid exercise of executive power" must be "particularly identified" on the face of a warrant.
152
Nothing in the Constitution, according to the Court, requires preconditions to be set forth because the particularity requirement apparently is limited to the narrow confines of its specific textual command.
153
A different aspect of particularity may arise, however, one not fully considered in Grubbs.
The police in People v. Bui 154 planted a tracking device in a package they determined contained "ecstasy" tablets. 155 Because they did not believe the nail salon to which the package was 151 See 547 U.S. at 97-98. 152 See id. 153 See id. The Court responded to Grubbs's contention by observing: That principle is not to be found in the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment does not require that the warrant set forth the magistrate's basis for finding probable cause, even though probable cause is the quintessential "precondition to the valid exercise of executive power." Much less does it require description of a triggering condition. Id. at 98.addressed was its final destination, 156 an anticipatory warrant was obtained for the premises at "any … location that the parcel is accepted …." 157 The warrant ultimately was executed at a location to which the package was taken, a location previously unknown to police.
158
The defendant contended that issuing a warrant with no specific description of the place to be searched violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. 159 Because Bui did not preserve this argument by raising it in his motion to suppress, the appellate court considered the issue waived. 160 The argument, though, seems meritorious and serves both as a reminder of the core particularity requirement reflected in the Grubbs analysis and as an example of the constitutional risks inherent in employing a warrant issued on an incomplete factual basis.
Potential errors of the sort Bui wanted to argue on appeal raise the prospect that "good faith"
will play a somewhat expanded role in post hoc review of an anticipatory warrant's validity. magistrates approving anticipatory warrants are not excused, and evidence obtained by executing those warrants will not be admissible.
It would be a mistake to view the dearth of opinions from Texas appellate courts on the issues surrounding anticipatory warrants as an indication either that such warrants are not being issued in Texas, or that Grubbs provides sufficient guidance for their use. As this practice becomes more familiar and those working in the criminal justice system come to appreciate the ways in which anticipatory warrants differ from other warrants, challenges must be expected.
Effective and comprehensive statutory guidance on the use of the anticipatory warrant by state law enforcement agencies in state prosecutions is the surest way to provide the certainty law enforcement deserves, as well as providing the protection Texas citizens require. Whether the future of the anticipatory warrant will be shaped by piecemeal and incomplete responses to challenges by defendants, 168 or instead by thoughtful legislative definition and guidance, for now, Texans are left only anticipating.
